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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Francis A. Heroux*
Evidence of Fingerprints Taken During an
Illegal Detention is Inadmissible-The defendant
was charged with the crime of robbery. At his trial,
the government sought to introduce his finger-
prints into evidence. The defendant objected on
the ground that the fingerprints had been taken
during a period of detention pursuant to an illegal
arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia excluded the evidence, hold-
ing that anything of evidentiary value, which the
public authorities have caused an arrested person
to yield to them during an illegal detention, is in-
admissible. Bynum v. United States, U.S. 27 LAw
WEEK 2293 (1958).
The Government conceded that the arrest and
detention were illegal; however, it sought to dis-
tinguish fingerprints from statements given during
detention and articles taken from a prisoner's
possession. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410
(1948). The court rejected this distinction, saying,
"In these situations, it is deemed a matter of over-
riding concern that effective sanctions be imposed
against illegal arrest and detention and the risks of
overreaching inherent in such action."
Thus, even though highly probative and seem-
ingly trustworthy evidence is excluded, the loss is
thought to be more than counterbalanced by the
salutary effect of a comprehensive rule that
illegal detention shall yield the prosecution no
evidentiary advantage in building a case against
the accused. This is based on the fourth amend-
ment to the Constitution which makes protection
of the individual against illegal seizure or arrest a
constitutional imperative. Therefore, judicial
authority must be exercised to implement this con-
stitutional guarantee.
Traffic Violator's Car May Only be Searched at
Time of Arrest-The defendant was arrested for
operating his automobile at an excessive rate of
speed. Following his arrest, he was taken to the
police station where he was charged with the traffic
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offense. While he was being booked, a policeman
went outside to the car, searched it, and found a
black-jack on the floor of the car. At his trial for
possession of the black-jack, the defendant moved
to suppress the weapon on the ground that it was
obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The
Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia suppressed this evidence, holding that a
search of the automobile at the police station was
not necessary, and any evidence seized in the
course of such a search must be suppressed.
Travers v. United States, 144 A. 2d 889 (1958).
The government defended the search without
warrant on the ground that it was merely a search
incident to a valid arrest. The court conceded that
a search incident to an arrest may be made in
order to search out means of escape, or to enable
the police to protect themselves from hidden
weapons or to discover the "fruits and evidences"
by which the crime had been committed. The
court held, however, that the first two reasons did
not apply to the facts of the case and that the third
was inapplicable because there could be no "fruits
and evidences" of the crime, which was, in this
case, a traffic offense. The search, therefore, was
illegal and the evidence was suppressed.
Evidence Supposedly Deposited During a Chase
While Out of Policeman's Sight Is Admissible-
After a chase of several miles, the police curbed
the defendant's car and arrested him on suspicion
of smuggling narcotics. However, a search of the
car produced nothing but marijuana sweepings.
Pressing their search further, the police retraced
the path of the chase to a point where the de-
fendant's car had been out of sight for a few
moments. Here the police found a sack of marijuana
alongside the road.
At the defendant's trial for illegal possession and
transportation of marijuana, the sack was intro-
duced into evidence, over the defendant's motion
to suppress it. On appeal, the defendant urged
this as error. The Court of Appeals rejected this
contention and affirmed the conviction, holding
that the relationship between the defendant and
the sack found along the road was a question of
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fact for the jury. Ketchum v. United States, 259 F.
2d 434 (5th Cir. 1958).
Counsel for the defendant objected to the intro-
duction of evidence relating to the sack of mari-
juana on the ground that the sack was not "con-
nected up with the defendant." However, the
court noted that this argument should be pointed
at the weight of the evidence, not at its admissi-
bility. Evidence tending to show that the defendant
had possession of the marijuana and that he sought
to conceal or destroy that evidence, was clearly
relevant and material. The question of how closely
connected the sack of marijuana was with the de-
fendant, and how much weight to attach to the
evidence, was for the jury to decide.
The court went on to say that because of the
variety of facts that may have circumstantial
probative value, the courts should be liberal in
admitting evidence of facts which bear some rele-
vancy to the matter in issue.
Law Enforcement Officer's Liability forActions
Taken Outside Own State-Plaintiff operated an
illegal gambling establishment on the state line
between Indiana and Michigan. The defendant, a
Michigan county sheriff, raided the establishment
in conjunction with the Indiana authorities. The
raid was a success, as the raiders found gambling
equipment and confiscated it. However, during the
course of the raid, great physical damage was done
to the house.
After the raid, it was learned that this building
and the gaming room were in the state of Indiana,
and the plaintiff sued the Michigan sheriff for the
damage done. The United States District Court
allowed recovery, holding that the acts of the
Michigan sheriff in Indiana were without juris-
diction, and that he was without authority to
participate in the raid in Indiana. Thus, the
Michigan sheriff was held liable for the damages
caused in the raid. Kapson v. Kurpath, 165 F.
Supp. 542 (1958).
The court pointed out that the authority of a
Michigan county sheriff is clearly limited by Michi-
gan statutes to the boundary lines of the county.
Furthermore, where these boundaries are not
clearly known, the extent of the jurisdiction will
depend upon a subsequent survey demarcating the
boundary. The defendant argued that even though
he was outside of his own authority, his actions
were justified because he was working with the
Indiana authorities on this raid. The court sum-
marily rejected this contention on the basis of
Indiana law, because a non-resident cannot be a
deputy of an Indiana sheriff. Thus the defendant's
actions were judged by the court against a stand-
ard of reasonableness as applied to an ordinary
citizen. On this theory, the court found the de-
fendant guilty of a tort, and liable for the damages
to the house.
Killing Policeman Was Self-Defense Where
Defendant Resisted "Beating Up" Rather Than
Arrest-The defendant was driving his truck when
it brushed against the car of a policeman traveling
in the same direction. When the defendant got out
of his truck to investigate, the policeman started
beating him about the head until he fell to his
knees. The policeman was carrying a holstered gun
and a blackjack but did not use the weapons. A
large crowd gathered and the defendant and some
members of the crowd urged the policeman to
exercise his power of arrest rather than continue
with his beating up tactics. The policeman refused
to do so and continued to beat the defendant. The
defendant told the policeman that he wouldn't be
beating him if he didn't have the gun. The police-
man then walked to his car and took the gun and
holster belt off. On his way back to where the de-
fendant stood, he became involved in an argument
with some members of the crowd. Seeing this, the
defendant went to the policeman's car, took the
gun, and pointed it at the officer. Warned by the
crowd, the officer advanced toward the defendant,
whereupon the defendant held the gun at arm's
length, shut his eyes, and shot six times. The
policeman was killed instantly. The defendant was
convicted of murder, but the Illinois Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the ground that
the defendant had acted in self-defense. People v.
McGraw, 13 IM. 2d 249, 149 N.E. 2d 100 (1958).
The defendant and the state were agreed that
the rule of self-defense in Illinois is that a person
who is in a place where he has a lawful right to be
and who is unlawfully assaulted and put in ap-
parent danger of death or great bodily harm may
stand his ground, meet force with force, to the
extent of taking life, if necessary, to save himself
from death or great bodily harm.
The court found that the attack on the defendant
was entirely unjustified and that the defendant
had offered no resistance to arrest if such an arrest
was contemplated. Viewing the situation through
the defendant's eyes the court concluded that his
action, under the circumstances of the case, was
within the bounds of the privilege of self-defense.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 568-569,
supra)
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